Fiat-Shamir Bulletproofs are Non-Malleable (in the Random Oracle Model)

Fiat-Shamir Bulletproofs are Non-Malleable (in the Random Oracle Model)
Chaya Ganesh, Claudio Orlandi, Mahak Pancholi, Akira Takahashi, Daniel Tschudi
IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch., :147, 2023.

Abstract. Bulletproofs (Bünz et al. IEEE S&P 2018) are a celebrated ZK proof system that allows for short and efficient proofs, and have been implemented and deployed in several real-world systems. In practice, they are most often implemented in their non-interactive version obtained using the Fiat-Shamir transform. A security proof for this setting is necessary for ruling out malleability attacks. These attacks can lead to very severe vulnerabilities, as they allow an adversary to forge proofs re-using or modifying parts of the proofs provided by the honest parties. An earlier version of this work (Ganesh et al. EUROCRYPT 2022) provided evidence for non-malleability of Fiat-Shamir Bulletproofs. This was done by proving simulation-extractability, which implies non-malleability, in the algebraic group model. In this work, we generalize the former result and prove simulation extractability in the programmable random oracle model, removing the need for the algebraic group model. Along the way, we establish a generic chain of reductions for Fiat-Shamir-transformed multi-round public-coin proofs to be simulation-extractable in the (programmable) random oracle model, which may be of independent interest. Note: Preliminary version appeared at EUROCRYPT 2022. This is a full version of EC:GOPTT22 with improved results and supersedes ePrint 2021/1393. - 04.13.2023 Added a concurrent work section

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